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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
ARTICLE 1 - SHORT TITLE; APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS
CPLR 103(c): Proceeding will not be dismissed because brought
in improper form.
CPLR 103(c) provides that once a court has jurisdiction over
the parties to a civil judicial proceeding, that proceeding shall not
be dismissed solely because it is brought in the improper form.
A recent illustration of the usefulness of this provision is provided
by Victor J. Georgetti, Inc. v. City of Long Beach.'
Petitioner, a government contractor, instituted an Article 78
proceeding seeking a judgment compelling the City Council of Long
Beach to enact a resolution for the payment of monies due him.
Without deciding whether a money judgment must be obtained
against the city before mandamus will lie, the Supreme Court,
Nassau County, held that the pleadings could be treated as a
demand for an interlocutory judgment against the city for the
amount owing, and, should the city council refuse to appropriate
the owed funds, petitioner could then apply, in this proceeding, for
a judgment in mandamus.
ARTICLE 2- LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 205(a): Relief available when application for adjournment
on grounds of actual engagement is denied.
Under CPLR 20 5 (a), a plaintiff, who has timely commenced
an action that is subsequently terminated for reasons other than a
voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal for neglect to prosecute or a
final judgment on the merits, may commence a new action within
six months after the termination. Dismissals for failure to answer
a calendar call and failure to select a jury do not usually amount
to neglect to prosecute unless there is a pattern of dilatory tactics
or a contumacious refusal to proceed with the litigation. In
determining whether the dismissal is for neglect to prosecute, the
key factor is apparently the intention of the trial judge who grants
the motion to dismiss..2
In Cordova v. City of New York,' plaintiff's first action was
dismissed when an application for adjournment on the ground of
actual engagement was denied. Upon the commencement of a
'58 Misc. 2d 275, 295 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
27B MCKiNNEY'S CPLR 205, supp. commentary 45 (1966). See
Schuman v. Hertz Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 604, 215 N.E.2d 683, 268 N.Y.S.2d 563
(1966) (mem.), rev'g 23 App. Div. 2d 646, 257 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st Dep't
1965). See also 1 WEINSTEIN, KoRur & MILLER, Nmv YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
205.06 (1968).
357 Misc. 2d 823, 293 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1968).
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